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1 Introduction
Globalization means that market participants must take into account not only domestic
information but also information from markets around the world. Hence, it is intu-
itively clear that the economic situation in individual countries strongly affects the
behavior of international investors. Macroeconomic data are a very important source
of information not only about the actual state of real economies but more importantly
about their future prospects. This implies that macroeconomic news announcements
impact investors’ expectations and are the sources of price changes on stock markets.
Although Chen et al. (1986) argued that the endogeneity of macroeconomic policy
implies that the explanatory power of macroeconomic variables for stock returns is low,
there have been a growing number of contributions demonstrating the strong influence
of macroeconomic data on stock markets. The majority of these studies concern the
impact of US macroeconomic data on the US and to a lesser extent on other developed
markets (e.g. Schwert 1981; Pearce and Roley 1985; Li and Hu 1998; Nikkinen and
Sahlström 2004; Boyd et al. 2005; Andersen et al. 2007; Harju and Hussain 2011).
This is a natural consequence of the US economy being the largest and most important
economy in the world.
A similar reaction to US data also can be expected on emerging markets due to
their stronger and stronger relationships with developed markets. This process of
strengthening mutual relationships is particularly visible in economies from Central
and Eastern Europe which are in transition. Their accession to the EU has meant that
this part of Europe is subject to a growing influence of highly developed western
economies, including the US. This is should be reflected in the sensitivity of stock
markets to macroeconomic news from developed countries. However, the impact of
macroeconomic announcements from highly developed economies on emerging equity
markets in Central and Eastern Europe has been the subject of few contributions (e.g.
Nikkinen et al. 2006; Gurgul et al. 2012).
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of unexpected news about six US
macroeconomic indicators on the behavior of different groups of stocks on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange (WSE). The focus on the reaction of the WSE is because it is the largest
and most liquid stock market in the region1 and because if US data announcements
influence the stock markets of new EU members, this impact should be particularly
visible on the WSE. Due to the relatively high liquidity of assets the reaction of stock
prices on the WSE is expected to be comparable to the reactions of developed markets.
Additionally, foreign investors, mainly from the UK and France, own about 49 % of
the stocks on the WSE while the share of Polish institutional investors amounts to
37 % and that of individual investors to about 14 %. The large proportion of foreign
and institutional investors on the WSE suggests a rather high level of efficiency. New
public information should be very quickly incorporated into prices and the effect of
announcements should be visible just after a news release. Recently it has been proven
that US macroeconomic news has an effect on investor behavior and on the stock prices
1 According to monthly report of the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) the total capi-
talization of the WSE was 126 680.7mln e at the end of April 2013. In this part of Europe only the stock
exchanges in Istanbul and Moscow have a larger capitalization than the WSE.
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of companies from western countries (e.g. Harju and Hussain 2011). A similar reaction
of foreign investors can be expected on the WSE.
In this paper we study the impact of the following US macroeconomic indicator
announcements: the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Industrial Production (IP), the Pro-
ducer Price Index (PPI), Durable Goods Orders (DGO), Retail Sales (RS) and Nonfarm
Payrolls (NFP). The behavior of different groups of stocks on the WSE is described by
1-min returns of three WSE indices, namely: WIG20, mWIG40 and sWIG80 which
describe stock prices of the largest, medium-sized and small companies, respectively.
We also examine the reaction of the WIG index as regards the behavior of almost all
stocks on the WSE.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the
literature related to the impact of macroeconomic announcements on security prices.
In Sect. 3, conjectures are formulated and justified. Section 4 describes the data and
methodology applied in this study. The empirical results are presented and discussed
in Sect. 5. The last section concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
Statistical offices in different countries, including federal agencies and bureaus from
the US make regularly scheduled public announcements of macroeconomic data about
employment, inflation, prices, production, consumption, etc. The effects of these
announcements on stock prices, volatility and trading volume have received consider-
able attention not only in the popular press but also in the academic literature. Krueger
(1996) stresses that since 1983 every time the Bureau of Labor Statistics has released
employment data, on that day and on the following day, the New York Times quoted
the release as influencing the bond or stock market.
In much of the more recent literature there is a wide coverage of the impact of
macroeconomic news surprises on financial assets. The contributions by Fleming
and Remolona (1997), Bollerslev et al. (2000), Furfine (2001), Balduzzi et al.
(2001), and Green (2004) provide evidence that news surprises about macroeconomic
data, including GDP, the inflation rate, the unemployment rate and consumer con-
fidence are responsible for changes in Treasury yields especially around the time
of the announcements. The intuition concerning the importance of macroeconomic
announcements for stock markets is also confirmed by numerous papers. Early stud-
ies focused on the US market. Subsequent analyses were extended to other developed
markets.
Geske and Roll (1983) posit a negative relation between changes in inflation and
stock returns. This relation is observed because expected changes in inflation signal
a higher future rate of monetary expansion and thus impact on investors’ expecta-
tions. Inflation rate announcements affect the financial market not just by changes in
expectations about future inflation. Such announcements also have an effect on the
real economy by forcing particular actions. For example, unanticipated high infla-
tion could force agents to increase their savings and might be a reason for expecting
a more restrictive monetary policy. The consequences of such a reaction would be
higher interest rates and lower stock prices. Unexpected new information contained
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in CPI or PPI announcements therefore are likely to be positively related to interest
rates and negatively related to stock prices.
These relationships are also confirmed by McQueen and Roley (1993) who examine
the impact of various pieces of macroeconomic news on daily data of the S&P500
from September 1977 to May 1988. They consider e.g. industrial production, the
unemployment rate, nonfarm payrolls, CPI and PPI. The results indicate the strong
impact of macroeconomic news on stock prices, especially when different stages of
the business cycle are taken into account.
Li and Hu (1998) extend previous findings by analyzing the impact of broad sets
of macroeconomic announcements (e.g. CPI, PPI, Industrial Production, Unemploy-
ment) on daily returns of the DJIA and on the S&P500 in the period 1980–1996. They
find that the reaction of stock prices strongly depends on the state of the economy.
From this paper it also follows that the reactions of the stocks of small and large
companies are different.
The relations between the stage of an economy and investors’ reactions to macro-
economic news announcements is carefully analyzed by Boyd et al. (2005) who study
the impact of US Unemployment Rate announcements on the S&P500 stock index in
the period from February 1948 to December 2000. They show that the reaction of the
stock market depends on the state of the economy, i.e. during contractions average
stock returns are positive when good news is announced and negative on a day of bad
news. On the other hand, during expansions the situation is quite different—average
stock returns are positive regardless of the information contained in the announce-
ment. The contributors suggest that unemployment news contain information about
future interest rates and about future corporate earnings and dividends. An increase
in unemployment typically signals a decline in interest rates. This is good news for
stocks. However, unemployment is also a reason for a decline in future corporate
earnings and dividends, which is bad news for investors. The relative importance of
these two effects changes over time and depends on the state of the economy i.e. dur-
ing expansions information about interest rates dominates, while during contractions
it is information about equity risk premiums and future corporate dividends which
dominates.
Apart from the impact of macroeconomic announcements on stock prices, evi-
dence on the effect of macroeconomic news on return volatility have been also found.
Li and Engle (1998) analyze the effects of scheduled and unscheduled US macroeco-
nomic news on volatility. They find that the impact of unscheduled macroeconomic
news on conditional volatility is more persistent. On the other hand, volatility reacts
asymmetrically to scheduled announcements; it decreases after positive shocks and
increases after negative shocks. Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) study the impact
of the announcements of 17 different macroeconomic data on the daily return volatil-
ity of the value-weighted NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ market index between January
1980 and December 1996. They confirm the significant response of return volatility
to CPI, PPI, Monetary Aggregate, Balance Trade, Employment Report and Housing
Starts announcements. Also Bonfim (2003) confirms the effect of macroeconomic
news (about monetary policy) on the volatility of stock returns.
The impact of US macroeconomic data on other developed countries also has been
examined. For example, Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) use daily data from January
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1996 to December 1999 to study the impact of macroeconomic announcements on the
German and Finnish equity markets. Their data set consists of monthly announcements
of CPI, PPI and Unemployment Rate from Germany, Finland and the US. The results of
the study indicate that domestic macroeconomic data announcements do not influence
either the German or the Finnish markets. However, the implied volatility on both
markets reacts significantly to US data about the UR and PPI while CPI news impacts
only on the Finnish market.
Nikkinen et al. (2006) extend the above study to an analysis of the impact of US
macroeconomic indicator announcements on stock markets in the various parts of
the world. They consider six groups of countries including some developed markets
and emerging markets in Europe, Asia and Latin America. The results indicate differ-
ences in the reaction to US macroeconomic data announcements among those regions.
Developed countries in Europe and Asia are very sensitive to US data releases with
CPI, employment costs and employment situation being the most influential indicators.
On the other hand, the reaction of the group of European countries in transition (the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) is insignificant. This leads
to the conclusion that there is weak integration between the developed and emerging
markets in Europe.
Recently intraday data have been frequently applied in the analysis of stock mar-
ket reactions to US macroeconomic announcements. On the basis of 5-min returns
Andersen et al. (2007) investigate the impact of 22 US macroeconomic indicators on
the stock, bond and exchange markets in the US, UK and Germany from July 1998
to end of December 2002. The results of the paper confirm the significant impact of
US macroeconomic announcements on the conditional means of European stock mar-
kets. The authors also show that stock market reactions depend on the state of the US
economy i.e. traditionally bad information has a positive impact on European markets
during expansions.
The impact of US macroeconomic releases on European stock markets is also
examined by Harju and Hussain (2011). They study a wide set of US macroeconomic
news announcements from September 2000 to March 2006. Their findings show that
US macroeconomic surprises imply the immediate and significant reaction of intraday
volatility and 5-min returns of major European stock indices (i.e. CAC40, DAX30,
FTSE100 and SMI).
More detailed data are used by Entorf and Steiner (2007) who study the response
of 15-s returns of the German stock market index DAX to announcements of macro-
economic business cycle forecasts. The paper shows that both returns and volatility
react significantly and immediately after an announcement, revealing the high level of
efficiency of the German stock market. However, the reaction of returns quickly dis-
appears, whereas return volatility remains increased up to 2 min after a news release.
The authors also show that unanticipated shocks imply an asymmetric reaction of
returns: good news lead to more pronounced reactions than bad news. Moreover, there
is evidence of mean reversion and calm-before-the-storm effects.
There is a very limited number of papers concerning the impact of macroeconomic
news on emerging markets in Europe. One of them is the paper of Nikkinen et al. (2006)
mentioned above. The reaction of 12 emerging bond markets (including Poland) to
various US macroeconomic announcements is studied by Andritzky et al. (2007). On
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the basis of country subindices of the Emerging Market Bond Index from January
1998 to July 2004 the authors show that international news is more significant than
domestic news. In general, US macroeconomic announcements impact on (reduce)
bond spread volatility.
The impact of US macroeconomic data on the Polish stock market is analyzed by
Gurgul et al. (2012). They study the reaction of the daily returns of the WIG20 (the
main index of the Warsaw Stock Exchange) to announcements about CPI, the Unem-
ployment Rate and Industrial Production in the US. This paper shows that investors
significantly respond to CPI and IP unexpected news while UR releases seem to have
no impact on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
3 Main conjectures
Taking into account the literature overview we formulate some conjectures about
the relationship between the information content of the announcements of six US
macroeconomic indicators and the returns of WSE indices.
From event study theory it is well known that good news causes positive abnormal
returns and bad news implies negative returns at the event time and after. Hence we
expect that the following hypothesis holds true:
Conjecture 1 CPI and PPI announcements below forecast and IP, DGO, RS and NFP
above forecast are good news and the intraday returns of WSE indices react positively
to them, i.e. these announcements are followed by positive abnormal returns. On the
other hand, CPI and PPI announcements above forecast and IP, DGO, RS and NFP
below forecast are bad news and imply a negative reaction of the indices, i.e. these
announcements are followed by negative abnormal returns of WSE indices.
In light of this hypothesis, we divide all events into two clusters: good news and bad
news. In the next step we also analyze the effects of good and bad news irrespective
of the announced macroeconomic indicator.
The results from developed markets mentioned in the previous sections prove the
instantaneous reaction of stock prices to various macroeconomic data announcements.
We conjecture a similar reaction of WSE indices:
Conjecture 2 There is a significant reaction of WSE indices to US macroeconomic
indicator announcements immediately after a news release.
In the financial literature the speed of adjustment hypothesis is well known (Brennan
et al. 1993). According to it the stocks of firms that are tracked by many analysts tend
to react faster than the stocks of firms that are tracked by fewer analysts. In general,
the largest companies (i.e. blue chips) listed in the main index of the stock market are
the most visible. Their stocks are also the most liquid and trading in such stocks is
more transparent and efficient than in the stocks of companies that attract less investor
attention. According to the speed of adjustment hypothesis, smaller firms (e.g. those
listed in the mWIG40 and sWIG80), attracting less investor attention, react more
slowly to public information than large companies listed in the WIG20. Note that we
do not distinguish between companies listed in the mWIG40 and the sWIG80, i.e.
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they are in the same cluster because investors pay attention mainly to stocks listed in
the WIG20. The other stocks are less visible. Hence we conjecture:
Conjecture 3 The response to US macroeconomic data announcements depends on
the size of companies, i.e. the returns of the WIG20 react faster to unexpected news
about US macroeconomic indicators than the returns of the mWIG40 and sWIG80.
Moreover, the impact of new information on the WIG20 is significant over a shorter
period of time after the event than the impact on mWIG40 and sWIG80.
An important topic in the financial literature is the widely observed asymmetrical
reaction of stock prices to good and bad news. In general, stock prices overreact to bad
news and underreact to good news, i.e. changes in stock prices caused by bad news
are larger in their magnitude than changes implied by good news (e.g. Kothari et al.
2009).
Thus, we aim to check the hypothesis:
Conjecture 4 The reaction of WSE indices to bad news is stronger than the reaction
to good news.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Announcements
In this paper we investigate the impact of the announcements of six US macroeconomic
indicators, i.e. the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Producer Price Index (PPI), Indus-
trial Production (IP), Retail Sales (RS), Durable Goods Orders (DGO) and Nonfarm
Payrolls (NFP). We choose these macroeconomic indicators for three reasons. First,
they are among the most important US indicators and their impact is widely studied
in the literature.2 Secondly, announcements about these indicators are released on a
monthly basis and they describe the US economy in the previous month. This ensures
a sufficient number of important announcements to conduct the study. Thirdly, these
indicators are released during trading hours on the WSE and thus their impact can be
empirically verified.
Most of the announcements under study are released at 8.30 EST (14.30 CET).3
Only Industrial Production is released at 9.15 EST (15.15 CET). Because Daylight
Saving Time is introduced in the US one week earlier than in Europe, in some cases
the announcements reach the WSE 1 h earlier i.e. at 13.30 CET and 14.15 CET, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, all announcements under study are released far enough from the
period of increased volatility at the beginning and at the end of the trading sessions
on the WSE.
In this paper we study the impact of unexpected news contained in US macroeco-
nomic announcements. Thus, for each macroeconomic news release the actual value
2 In the majority of papers the unemployment situation in the US is described by the Unemployment Rate.
However, as Andersen et al. (2007) show, Nonfarm Payrolls is one of the most significant macroeconomic
announcements.
3 EST—Eastern Standard Time, CET—Central European Time.
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of the announced indicator is compared with its consensus forecast. All comparisons
are performed on the basis of the consensus published by Bloomberg a few days before
announcements. It allows us to divide all releases into three clusters: ‘above consen-
sus’, ‘below consensus’ and ‘in line with consensus’. Because the news in the last
cluster is in line with previous investor expectations, our analysis focuses only the first
two clusters, which contain unexpected news. In the case of IP, RS, DGO and NFP,
an announcement above the consensus is expected to have a positive impact on the
stock market, whereas a CPI and a PPI higher than the consensus is expected to have
a negative impact. Analogously, IP, RS, DGO, NFP below consensus are expected to
be bad news for investors whereas a CPI and a PPI lower than forecasts are expected
to have a positive impact.
The announcements under study are released on different days of the month and
different days of the week. NFP is one of the indicators published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in the Employment Report which is announced at the beginning of the
month, usually on the first Friday. Hence, it is the earliest published indicator in the
month of the indicators under study. The CPI, PPI, IP and RS are released in the middle
of the month, around the 15th, by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve and
the Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce, respectively. DGO is announced
the latest, around the 26th of the month. The majority of the announcements under
study (167) were released on Fridays, mainly due to NFP announcements. However,
when the other indicators are considered alone, the majority of the announcements
(114) were released on Wednesdays. Because US macroeconomic data are released
on different days of the month there are days when more than one announcement is
released. In our dataset there are 71 such cases which are observed in the middle of
the month. The most frequent are announcements on the same day about the IP and
CPI (31 releases) and about PPI and RS (24 releases). Additionally, in two cases the
CPI, IP and RS are announced on the same day. Only DGO and NFP are announced
separately.
The sequence in which US macroeconomic indicator announcements are released
may play an important role in the perception of them by investors. NFP is published
first in the month among the indicators under study and it describes the condition of the
US labor market in the previous month. This alone could attract investors’ attention
to it. On the other hand, when indicators are announced day by day their impact is
weaker than when there is only one separate announcement. Thus, the impact of the
CPI, PPI, IP and RS seems to be weaker than the impact of DGO and NFP. Another
reason that supports this conjecture is the fact that indicator forecasts are published by
Bloomberg a few days before the announcement and any news after that could change
investor expectations and make forecasts out-of-date. Thus for some announcements
the difference between the released value of an indicator and its consensus may be
expected news.
When two or more indicators are announced on the same day, we consider only
the first of them. Subsequent announcements on the same day are excluded from the
sample because expectations about their value could be heavily influenced by earlier
news. This is what is called the cofounding events problem. When two announcements
are published at the same hour we take them into account only if they do not contain
contradictory information, i.e. when both of them are good, or both of them are bad or
123
The importance of company size to information flow 803
one of them is in line with consensus. This allows us to avoid or at least to minimize
the problem of confounding events. The final numbers of the different types of events
under study that take place during trading days on the WSE are reported in Sect. 5 in
Tables 1 and 2 together with results of the empirical study.
4.2 Returns
We investigate the impact of macroeconomic announcements on different types of
stocks listed on the WSE and described by three indices, the WIG20, mWIG40 and
sWIG80. The WIG20 is the index of the largest companies and is based on the value of
a portfolio with the shares of the 20 major and most liquid companies (blue chips) on
the WSE Main List. The mWIG40 index consists of medium-size companies and its
value is computed on the basis of the stock prices of 40 medium size companies listed
on the WSE Main List, while the sWIG80 is the small-firm index and it comprises 80
smaller companies listed on the WSE Main List. All computations in this paper are
based on 1-min log-returns computed on the basis of intraday data between 1 April
2007 and 30 August 2013. The length of this period is due to changes in the quotations
of the main indices on the WSE. Since April 2007 the WIG20 has been published every
15 s while the mWIG and sWIG are published every 60 s during trading sessions.
In the literature on intraday analysis it is common to use 5-min returns as a compro-
mise between accuracy and the negative effects of market microstructure (e.g. Jones
et al. 2005; Andersen et al. 2007; Harju and Hussain 2011). However, the problem
of market microstructure noise is typical for stocks with low liquidity and should be
of only minor importance when stock indices are examined. Moreover, the above-
mentioned literature confirms that the reaction of the stock market to important news
releases occurs in the first 5 min after announcements or even earlier (Entorf and
Steiner 2007). Hence, more frequent returns must be analyzed.
4.3 Event study
In the majority of the studies mentioned in the previous sections the response of
stock returns to news announcements is examined via different kinds of regressions
or autoregressions with additional sets of dummy variables corresponding to the news
announcements examined (e.g. Flannery and Protopapadakis 2002; Jones et al. 2005;
Andersen et al. 2007; Harju and Hussain 2011). Frequently, conditional volatility is
also modeled by various ARCH-type models. In this approach the significance of the
impact of news announcements is equivalent to the significance of the correspond-
ing dummy variable. Generally, these regressions are performed on the basis of a
whole sample of intraday returns. As well as standard model specification issues, this
approach entails overcoming various other problems, like seasonal patterns in intraday
volatility or the issue of overnight returns.
In this paper, however, we apply another way of testing stock price reactions to news
announcements. To investigate the impact of US macroeconomic news on the intraday
returns of WSE indices we use an event study methodology. This methodology is
mainly applied to detect the effects of various news on daily returns data (e.g. Corrado
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and Truong 2008). In recent years, however, an event study has also been applied to
intraday analysis (e.g. Dimpfl 2011).
In brief, an event study is the analysis of the significance of the abnormal behavior
of returns around the event (i.e. in the so-called event window). The events in our
study are defined as the unexpected macroeconomic news announcements described
in Sect. 4.1. Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between actual returns
and their expected values, i.e. for the i th event and time t they are given by the
formula:
ARit = Rit − E(Rit |t−1),
where E(Rit |t−1) is the expectation of Rit conditional on information set t−1
for time t − 1. In practice, expected returns are computed from a model estimated
on the basis of the returns from the pre-event window i.e. returns prior to the event
window. The appropriate choice of pre-event and event windows is a crucial issue in the
event study. The pre-event window should be as long as necessary to ensure suitable
properties of the model estimates. On the other hand it must not include any other
events (i.e. confounding events) that could influence returns and thus bias the results
of the analysis. In this paper we use a pre-event window of length 130 (this means that it
contains 130 1-min returns) and a 26-min event window. The event window consists of
five returns before the event, the return at the time point of the news release and twenty
1-min returns after the announcement time. The majority of the news announcements
under study are released at 14.30 CET. Hence, the pre-event window contains returns
from 12.15 CET to 14.24 CET while the event window contains returns from 14.25
to 14.50. Even if we take into account the earliest announcements at 13.30 CET and
the latest announcements at 15.15 CET the returns applied in the event study range
at most from 11.15 CET to 15.35 CET. Until September 2008 continuous trading
on the WSE used to take place from 9.30 to 16.10. This means that the pre-event
window starts at least 1 h and 45 min after the beginning of continuous trading on
the WSE and the event window ends at least 35 min before the close of the trading
session on the WSE. Thus, the intraday returns employed in this paper are from the
middle of the trading session and the computations are not influenced by highly volatile
returns at the beginning and at the end of a trading session. Moreover, because for
each announcement we use only 146 1-min returns (i.e. less than 3 h) from the middle
of a trading session it is unnecessary to take into account intraday seasonality of
returns.
To test the significance of the impact of macroeconomic news on WSE, i.e. to test
the significance of mean abnormal returns in the event window, we apply the rank
test of Corrado and Zivney (1992) with the correction of event-implied volatility. The
advantage of this nonparametric test is that is does not need any assumption about
the normality of abnormal returns and it has relatively high power when compared
to other tests commonly used in event studies (Corrado 2011). The test statistics is
constructed as follows.
If we denote the moment of a news release by t = 0 then the pre-event window
includes t = −135, . . . ,−6 while t = −5, . . . , 20 constitute the event window. It
should be noted here that the impact of the i th news announcement can be observed
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Fig. 1 Cross-sectional standard deviations of WIG20 abnormal returns (in %) in the pre-event window and
the event window (i.e. for t = −135, . . . , 20) when good news is announced (149 events in the cluster)
only for t ≥ 1. When news is released at 14.30 then Ri1 (return for t = 1) is computed
at 14.31 and describes the change in stock prices from 14.30 to 14.31. For each i th
event in the cluster we fit an appropriate ARMA(p,q) model4 to returns in the pre-
event window, and for t = −135, . . . , 20, the abnormal return ARit is defined as
the difference between the actual return Rit and the one-step ARMA forecast. The
application of the ARMA model instead of, for example, the constant mean model
reduces significantly the autocorrelation in abnormal returns. Then, for each event, all
abnormal returns in the event and pre-event windows are standardized:













is the standard deviation of abnormal returns in the pre-event window. In the practical
analysis, however, increased volatility of abnormal returns is frequently observed in
the event window (Corrado 2011; Corrado and Truong 2008). This phenomenon is
also present in the case of the macroeconomic news announcements under study. As
an example, Fig. 1 presents cross-sectional standard deviations of WIG20 abnormal
returns in the pre-event and event windows when good news is announced. As can be
noticed, abnormal returns volatility increases after the news release (for t > 0) and
is highest in the first minute. For t ≤ 0 one can observe low variation. As mentioned
earlier this is due to the fact that, in practice, Ri0 i.e. the 1-min return for t = 0, is the
last return before investors learn the news.
4 We consider all combinations of p and q for p, q = 1, . . . , 5. In the presence of heteroscedastisity in
residuals we apply ARM A(p, q)−G ARC H(1, 1) model. We choose the appropriate ARMA model taking
into account not only information criteria but also results of Ljung–Box tests for autocorrelations.
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To control for this event-induced change in the cross-sectional variance we adjust
the standardized abnormal returns:
SAR′i t =
{
SARit t = −135, . . . , 0
SARit/S(SARt ) t = 1, . . . , 20,
where










(SARit − SARit )2
is the cross-sectional standard deviation of standardized abnormal returns and N is the
number of events in a cluster. We test the significance of abnormal returns for each t0
in the event window separately. Thus for each t0 = −5, . . . , 20 the Corrado–Zivney
TC Z statistics is defined as in Corrado (2011):













n(n + 1)/12 ,




denotes the rank of SAR′i t0 within the vector consisting of standardized abnormal
returns from the pre-event window and SAR′i t0 . The distribution of TC Z statistics con-
verges rapidly to the standard normal distribution as the number of events N increases.
5 Empirical results
The main assumption of the Corrado–Zivney test (and any other tests in the event
study) is the independence of abnormal returns. When we fit an ARMA model to
returns in the pre-event window we also perform the Ljung–Box portmanteau test
and choose only a model with uncorrelated residuals. Thus abnormal returns are not
autocorrelated. We do not have to check the abnormal returns for normality because
the Corrado–Zivney test is a rank test.
In the first step of the study we examine the impact of each macroeconomic indicator
separately. The findings are reported in Tables 1 and 2 for announcements below
and above the consensus, respectively. The analysis of the reaction of the WIG20,
mWIG40 and sWIG80 is presented in separate panels of Tables 1 and 2, while each
column contains the means of the abnormal returns in the event window for specific
macroeconomic indicator announcements. To save space we report ARt only for the
time very close to the announcement, i.e. for t = −3, . . . , 6. This is the most important
period of time just before and just after announcements when new information is
incorporated into prices. As will be presented later (see Fig. 3) the impact of unexpected
news weakens with time and there are almost no significant results for t greater than
6. To facilitate the analysis of the event study results we also report the number of
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events in each cluster. The impact of a news release is described by the behavior of
abnormal returns just after the news release. Thus, particular attention should be paid
to the value and significance of AR1. However, when analyzing the results in Tables 1
and 2 we must take into account the sequence in which US macroeconomic indicators
are announced during the month.
5.1 Announcements below consensus
The sign of mean abnormal returns in Table 1 for t = 1 confirms that, irrespective of
the index we examine, announcements of IP, DGO, RS and NFP below forecast are
seen by investors as bad news while a CPI and a PPI below consensus are good news.
There are significantly negative reaction of the WIG20 in just the first minute
after IP, DGO, RS and NFP announcements. However, IP, DGO and RS imply a
significant reaction only in the first minute while the reaction to NFP announcements
is significant also 2 min after the release. No other means of abnormal returns after the
events are significant. The strongest reaction in the first minute after the announcement
(AR1 ∼= −0.26 %) is induced by unexpected news from the US labor market included
in NPF. In fact, this is the largest (in absolute value) mean abnormal return in the study.
It also confirms the importance of information contained in the Employment Report
(see Andersen et al. 2007) for the Polish stock market. These results for the WIG20
are in line with Conjectures 1 and 2.
The reaction of medium-sized firms listed on the mWIG is quite different from the
reaction of the firms on the WIG20. Significant mean abnormal returns are observed
not only in the first minutes after an announcement but also later, even up to 6 min after
a news release. Such a longer reaction is visible especially for DGO and NFP. What is
interesting is the fact that for the mWIG40 and sWIG80 the strongest reaction is not
observed in the first minute after the release as it is for the WIG20. For example, when
DGO is announced, then AR6 is the largest mean, while for NFP the largest is AR3.
Moreover, AR1 is for the mWIG much closer to zero than AR1 is for the WIG20.
This suggests that in the case of medium-sized firms unexpected negative information
implies a weaker reaction and the news is more slowly incorporated into prices than
in the case of large firms.
A slow reaction pattern and significant ARt for t > 1 is also observed for the
sWIG80. However, there are some differences between the reactions of the sWIG
and the mWIG. The sWIG exhibits a significantly positive mean (at the 10 % level)
just after CPI announcements. This suggests that information about inflation in the
US attracts the attention of small firm investors. The reaction of medium and big
firms to CPI is not so evident because positive AR1 for the WIG20 and mWIG are
not significant. The second difference is the lack of any significant reaction of small
firms to news about RS. RS is a quite good example of differences in the reaction of
the indices under study because its announcements imply a more and more delayed
response of the indices: AR1 is significant for the WIG20, AR2 is significant for the
mWIG40 and ARt are insignificant for the sWIG80. This also reflects the general rule
that the stocks of small firms react in the first minutes after announcements only to the
most common macroeconomic data, i.e. to news about inflation and unemployment.
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Table 1 Mean abnormal returns (in %) of the WIG20, mWIG40, sWIG80 and WIG in the event window















−3 −0.0176 −0.0211 0.0061 −0.0087 −0.0023 0.0033
−2 −0.0038 0.0098 −0.0010 −0.0087* −0.0048 0.0095
−1 −0.0159 −0.0016 0.0038 −0.0146** −0.0105 0.0087
0 −0.0071 0.0014 0.0003 0.0098 0.0098 −0.0049
1 0.0788 −0.0400** 0.0093 −0.1625*** −0.1380** −0.2576***
2 0.0459 −0.0187 0.0360 −0.0042 −0.0358 −0.0422*
3 −0.0091 −0.0106 0.0088 −0.0123 0.0087 −0.0134
4 −0.0192 0.0014 0.0021 −0.0001 0.0070 0.0475
5 0.0255 0.0007 −0.0027 0.0006 −0.0359 0.0173
6 0.0153 0.0334 −0.0045 −0.0083 −0.0061 0.0059
mWIG40
−3 −0.0002 −0.0063 −0.0068 0.0015 −0.0044 0.0009
−2 0.0067** −0.0059 −0.0124 0.0039 −0.0031 0.0029
−1 −0.0009 0.0102 0.0059 −0.0005 −0.0035 0.0020
0 0.0009 0.0005 −0.0062 −0.0067 −0.0023 −0.0060
1 0.0027 0.0010 0.0034 −0.0075** −0.0118 −0.0096***
2 0.0040 −0.0005 0.0079 −0.0043 −0.0179** −0.0049
3 −0.0016 −0.0032 0.0056 −0.0132** 0.0041 −0.0216***
4 0.0013 −0.0064 0.0085 −0.0086*** −0.0065 −0.0019
5 0.0121 0.0024 0.0081** −0.0070 −0.0075 0.0019
6 0.0056 0.0100 0.0026 −0.0140*** −0.0191*** −0.0129***
sWIG80
−3 0.0013 0.0021 −0.0051 −0.0048 −0.0045 0.0000
−2 0.0106** −0.0004 −0.0011* −0.0040 0.0011 −0.0050**
−1 0.0026 −0.0049 0.0085 0.0016 −0.0135** −0.0029
0 −0.0009 0.0040 −0.0042 0.0028 0.0006 0.0024
1 0.0036* 0.0000 0.0045 −0.0010 −0.0074 −0.0091***
2 −0.0012 −0.0064 0.0109** −0.0068 −0.0019 −0.0266***
3 −0.0065 0.0101 0.0017 −0.0092** −0.0127 −0.0049
4 0.0050* 0.0024 0.0023 −0.0082* −0.0025 −0.0122**
5 −0.0001 −0.0020 0.0050 −0.0017 0.0017 −0.0045
6 0.0038 0.0047 0.0066 0.0004 −0.0072 −0.0019
WIG
−3 −0.0047 −0.0069 −0.0019 −0.0024 −0.0015 −0.0008
−2 −0.0046 0.0025 −0.0090 −0.0042* −0.0045 0.0017
−1 −0.0099 −0.0008 0.0065 −0.0039 −0.0050 0.0077
0 −0.0023 0.0027 −0.0098 −0.0063 0.0036 −0.0251**
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1 0.0611 −0.0285*** 0.0197 −0.1005*** −0.0935** −0.1608***
2 0.0246 −0.0133 0.0317** 0.0031 −0.0148 −0.0098*
3 −0.0285** −0.0126 0.0048 −0.0135*** −0.0095 −0.0022
4 −0.0109 0.0013 0.0049 0.0035 0.0162 −0.0003
5 0.0221 0.0097** −0.0019 −0.0041 −0.0221 0.0142
6 0.0010 0.0180** −0.0057 −0.0054 −0.0128 −0.0071
*, **, *** Significance at 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively
Another difference between the returns of the sWIG80 and the returns of larger stocks
are significant means before announcements (CPI, PPI, RS and NFP). This particular
behavior of sWIG80 returns is probably caused by the larger number of individual and
small investors.
All the stocks from the WIG20, mWIG and sWIG are included in the WIG which
describes the whole WSE. Its reaction to new information is a combination of the
reactions of these indices. Stocks from the WIG20 constitute about 70 % of the WIG.
Hence WIG returns react significantly just after IP, DGO, RS and NFP announcements.
However, the reaction of medium-sized and small companies is not limited to the
first minute after news releases. Stocks from the mWIG and sWIG are probably also
responsible for significant ARt after news about inflation. However, it should be noted
here that when a CPI is below consensus AR3 is significantly negative, which suggests
a significant counter reaction.
As with the WIG20 there is almost no significant reaction of the WIG before a news
release. An important exception is a negative mean abnormal return just before NFP
announcements.
5.2 Announcements above consensus
Our findings within the framework of the event study for announcements above fore-
casts are summarized in Table 2. Analogously to Table 1, announcements of IP, DGO,
RS and NFP greater than expected are seen to be good news and lead to positive means
of abnormal returns. On the other hand, inflation greater than forecast is seen as bad
news. As before, the WIG20 reacts mainly in the first minute after a news release.
However, significant means are also observed for t > 1 (PPI, DGO and RS). For
CPI, PPI and NFP we observe significant (at the 5 and 10 % level) mean abnormal
returns before the event. Similarly to Table 1, the strongest reaction measured by AR1
occurs when NFP is announced (AR1 ∼= 0.18 %). There is an interesting reaction
pattern when PPI is announced. PPI greater than expected causes negative investor
reactions in the first minute (AR1 ∼= −0.1 %) which are, however, followed by a
significantly positive change in the next minute (AR2 ∼= 0.04 %). The reaction of the
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Table 2 Mean abnormal returns (in %) of WIG20, mWIG40, sWIG80 and WIG in the event window for















−3 −0.0071 −0.0173 0.0050 0.0028 0.0061 −0.0002
−2 0.0085 0.0210 −0.0100 0.0080 0.0093 0.0009
−1 0.0113* 0.0073 −0.0122* −0.0022 0.0054 0.0096
0 −0.0126 0.0046 −0.0002 0.0035 −0.0052 −0.0137**
1 −0.0937 0.1103 −0.1022** 0.1140*** 0.1299*** 0.1768***
2 −0.0332 0.0168 0.0413* 0.0107 0.0318 0.0313
3 0.0185 0.0882 0.0347 0.0354* 0.0361** 0.0138
4 0.0026 0.0176 −0.0165 0.0120 0.0089 0.0077
5 −0.0375 −0.0053 −0.0253 0.0033 0.0021 −0.0078
6 −0.0001 −0.0431** 0.0434** 0.0108 0.0008 −0.0092
mWIG40
−3 −0.0049 0.0042 0.0076 0.0013 −0.0024 −0.0048
−2 0.0037 −0.0229 −0.0092 −0.0047 −0.0017 −0.0055**
−1 −0.0063 0.0009 −0.0107* 0.0076* −0.0024 0.0076
0 −0.0090** 0.0016 −0.0024 0.0041 0.0008 0.0015
1 −0.0089 0.0061 0.0038 0.0087* 0.0069 0.0114
2 −0.0165* 0.0119 0.0009 −0.0028 0.0067 0.0026
3 −0.0003 −0.0013 −0.0019 −0.0010 0.0052** 0.0075
4 −0.0058 0.0069 −0.0075 −0.0068 −0.0011 0.0067
5 0.0004 0.0137 0.0064 0.0097** 0.0031 0.0006
6 −0.0141 0.0224*** 0.0000 0.0055** 0.0013 −0.0060
sWIG80
−3 0.0026 0.0041 0.0030 −0.0009 0.0120 0.0053
−2 −0.0046 −0.0114 −0.0027 0.0014 −0.0011 −0.0003
−1 0.0088** −0.0074 0.0074 0.0005 −0.0049 0.0027
0 −0.0020 0.0192*** −0.0041 0.0013 0.0005 −0.0112
1 −0.0083* 0.0052 −0.0034 0.0050** 0.0023 0.0043
2 −0.0054 0.0051 −0.0041 0.0009 0.0062 0.0038
3 −0.0048 0.0074 −0.0045 0.0005 0.0122* −0.0065
4 −0.0051 0.0010 0.0001 0.0040 0.0049 0.0048
5 0.0060 0.0019 −0.0028 0.0019 −0.0008 0.0024
6 −0.0083** 0.0098 −0.0077 0.0056 0.0126 0.0014
WIG
−3 0.0036 0.0108 −0.0012 0.0059** 0.0046 −0.0019
−2 −0.0012 −0.0029 −0.0118 −0.0015 0.0099** −0.0002
−1 −0.0014 0.0037 −0.0024 0.0069 −0.0025 0.0061
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0 −0.0020 0.0075 −0.0064 0.0005 −0.0039 0.0065
1 −0.0820 0.0814** −0.0633** 0.0812*** 0.0943*** 0.1084**
2 −0.0039 0.0097 0.0449** 0.0059 0.0186 0.0062
3 0.0029 0.0335 −0.0006 0.0220* 0.0309*** 0.0217
4 −0.0044 0.0125 −0.0096 0.0035 −0.0058 −0.0050
5 −0.0269 0.0081 0.0083 0.0115 0.0058 −0.0031
6 0.0129 −0.0065 0.0050 0.0015 −0.0032 −0.0025
*, **, *** Significance at 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively
mWIG just after the event is weaker than that of the WIG20. Only AR1 for DGO news
is significant at the 10 % level. For the other indices, significant means are observed
later, if at all. Similar insignificant reactions to good news can be noticed in the case of
the sWIG80. In first minute after the event, the only positive AR1 is for DGO. As we
see, the results for announcements above the consensus are also mostly in line with
Conjectures 1, 2 and 3.
The WIG mainly reflects the behavior of the WIG20, i.e. a significant reaction is
observed only in the first 3 min after a news release. In addition, with respect to the
WIG20, AR1 for IP is also significant.
5.3 Good and bad news
As mentioned in Sect. 3, we divide all announcements into the two clusters of good and
bad news on the basis of the results in Tables 1 and 2. The good news cluster contains
CPI and PPI announcements below forecast and IP, DGO, RS and NFP announcements
above forecast, while the bad news cluster contains CPI and PPI announcements above
forecast and IP, DGO, RS and NFP below forecast. The results of the event study
analysis for these two clusters are reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. For each
index we report mean abnormal returns and rank test statistics TC Z for t = −3, . . . , 6.
In general, there is no significant change in stock prices before the announcements.
The only exceptions are the AR−2’s of the sWIG and the WIG which are significant
at the 5 and 10 % levels, respectively, and AR0 for the WIG which is significant at
the 10 % level. The most important are the highly significant means of the abnormal
return for all indices just after the announcement. Each index reacts significantly neg-
atively to bad news in the first minute. The strongest reaction is visible for the WIG20
(AR1 ∼= −0.15 %) and is also reflected in WIG abnormal returns (AR1 ∼= −0.096 %).
This immediate and sharp decline in the stock prices of the largest firms disappears
very quickly and the following means are insignificant. The reactions of the mWIG
and the sWIG are lower in magnitude, but the mean abnormal returns are significantly
negative even up to 6 min after a news release. This is in line with previous results for
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Table 3 Mean abnormal returns (in %) and TC Z rank test statistics of WIG20, mWIG40, sWIG80 and
WIG in the event window for “bad news”
WIG20 mWIG sWIG WIG
ARt TC Z ARt TC Z ARt TC Z ARt TC Z
−3 −0.0038 −0.03 0.0000 0.27 −0.0005 0.54 −0.0014 −0.42
−2 −0.0001 −0.12 −0.0007 −0.44 −0.0030** −2.21 −0.0032* −1.79
−1 −0.0035 −1.11 −0.0018 −0.39 −0.0001 1.00 −0.0005 −0.28
0 0.0008 −0.53 −0.0047 −1.50 0.0007 0.58 −0.0077* −1.68
1 −0.1476*** −6.81 −0.0058*** −2.85 −0.0050*** −2.90 −0.0963*** −6.41
2 −0.0141 −1.24 −0.0065*** −3.45 −0.0099*** −4.73 0.0028 −0.45
3 0.0030 −0.21 −0.0080*** −3.07 −0.0052** −2.06 −0.0058** −2.09
4 0.0092 0.49 −0.0060*** −2.98 −0.0053** −2.55 0.0007 −0.11
5 −0.0102 −0.68 −0.0006 0.78 −0.0011 −0.54 −0.0016 0.37
6 0.0102 1.30 −0.0093*** −3.87 −0.0033 −1.15 0.0000 0.19
159 events from April 2007 to August 2013
*, **, *** Significance at 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively
Table 4 Mean abnormal returns (in %) and TC Z rank test statistics of WIG20, mWIG40, sWIG80 and
WIG in the event window for “good news”
WIG20 mWIG sWIG WIG
ARt TC Z ARt TC Z ARt TC Z ARt TC Z
−3 −0.0012 0.29 −0.0021 −1.19 0.0023 0.90 0.0011 0.78
−2 0.0038* 1.74 −0.0049 −0.83 0.0010* 1.95 −0.0014 0.30
−1 0.0007 −0.52 0.0040 1.33 0.0015 0.74 0.0022 0.71
0 −0.0037 −1.35 0.0005 0.46 −0.0018 0.14 −0.0009 −0.10
1 0.1044*** 5.06 0.0069** 2.04 0.0041*** 3.42 0.0744*** 4.95
2 0.0291*** 2.59 0.0037 1.55 0.0040*** 3.01 0.0159*** 2.64
3 0.0216* 1.89 0.0028** 2.24 0.0003* 1.76 0.0123 1.05
4 0.0039 −0.24 0.0017* 1.76 0.0040*** 3.18 −0.0014 −1.19
5 0.0030 −0.37 0.0071*** 2.83 0.0018 1.22 0.0068 0.76
6 0.0002 0.56 0.0029** 2.10 0.0059** 2.27 −0.0019 −0.37
149 events from April 2007 to August 2013
*, **, *** Significance at 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively
individual macroeconomic indicators. The reaction of WSE indices to good news is
similar. There is almost no significant ARt before the event. The significant reaction
starts at t = 1. The WIG20 has three significantly positive mean abnormal returns
while the reaction of the mWIG and sWIG is much longer. The results presented in
this subsection for good and bad news clusters also support Conjectures 1, 2, 3.
We use Bloomberg consensus as a measure of the forecasted value of the announced
indicator. This consensus, however, may not always reflect actual investors’ expecta-
tions because it is published a few days before announcements. Thus, we also examine
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the reactions of the WSE indices to the announcements in line with the consensus. The
abnormal returns of all indices under study induced by these “neutral” announcements
are insignificant in the event window. It means that the announcements in line with
the consensus do not impact the WSE indices.
5.4 Comparison of the reactions to bad and good news
The comparison of the means of abnormal returns in Tables 1 and 2 suggests that bad
news induce a stronger reaction of WSE indices in the first minute after a news release.
To verify this conjecture for each macroeconomic indicator and for each index of WSE
we compare abnormal returns in clusters ’above consensus’ and ’below consensus’.
However, abnormal returns in these clusters differ because one of them contains good
news with a positive mean of abnormal returns, whereas the other contains bad news
with a negative mean. Thus we multiply abnormal returns in one of the clusters by
−1. As an example, Fig. 2 presents box-plots of AR1 for good news and −AR1 for
bad news clusters. We see that the differences between means (or medians) in both
clusters are not so significant when compared to the variation of abnormal returns in
each cluster.
As mentioned previously, abnormal returns are not normally distributed. Thus we
use nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis test to test the significance of the difference between
the strength of the returns’ reaction to bad and good news measured as the deviation
of abnormal returns from zero. The null hypothesis in this test is that abnormal returns
for t = 1 in opposite clusters have the same distribution. We do not report details
of these results here because for any index of the WSE and for any macroeconomic
indicator the null hypothesis cannot be rejected even at the 10 % significance level.
These results indicate that there is no significant difference between the reaction of the
WSE indices to good and bad news contained in US macroeconomic announcements.
Hence the reaction can be seen as symmetric. This contradicts Conjecture 4.
As above, we also compare whether the reactions of the WIG20, mWIG40 and
sWIG80 differ in the first minute after any given macroeconomic indicator announce-
ment. The results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that such a conjecture is reasonable. To
Fig. 2 Box-and-whisker plots of AR1 (in %) in the “good news” cluster and −AR1 (in %) in the “bad
news” cluster for the WIG20
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Table 5 Comparison of WSE index reactions to different kinds of announcements
Below consensus Above consensus
KW p value KW p value
CPI 1.59 0.451 0.68 0.710
IP 4.92 0.085 4.61 0.100
PPI 0.66 0.720 2.87 0.238
DGO 23.2 9 × 10−9 13.0 0.002
RS 6.66 0.036 10.7 0.005
NFP 24.1 6 × 10−6 13.3 0.001
Bad news Good news
All 49.36 2 × 10−11 37.88 6 × 10−9
verify the significance of the differences between the distribution of AR1 for the WSE
indices in each cluster we apply the Kruskal–Wallis test. The results of the testing
procedure are summarized in Table 5. For each US macroeconomic indicator and
for each cluster (below or above consensus) we report the value of Kruskal–Wallis
statistics (KW) with a corresponding p value. Additionally, we report the results of
the Kruskal–Wallis test for all good or bad news. It can be noticed that the returns
of the WSE indices react significantly differently (at the 1 % level) to DGO and NFP
announcements irrespective of their values and of the announced value of RS being
greater than expected. The reaction to announcements of RS below forecast is sig-
nificant at the 5 % level. The null hypothesis about the equality of distributions of all
indices’ abnormal returns 1 min after good or after bad news is also rejected at each
commonly-used significance level. This confirms the observations made on the basis
of the results in Tables 1 and 2 that WSE indices react significantly differently to some
US macroeconomic announcements. In general, this is mainly due to the immediate
and very strong reaction of the WIG20.
Not only the size of the abnormal returns caused by macroeconomic announcements
is important, but also the duration of the response of financial markets to news releases.
This problem is highlighted in the next subsection.
5.5 Duration of impact
In view of the above results it is reasonable to study the differences in the reaction
patterns of WSE indices to US macroeconomic news announcements. To describe
the duration and the strength of index reactions we compare their cumulative mean
abnormal returns (CUM_AR) for the first 20 min after a news release. To make the
comparison of the reaction to good and bad news easier we multiply the cumulative
mean abnormal returns for the release of bad news by −1. The top panel of Fig. 3
illustrates the strong and immediate reaction of the WIG20 which takes place at most
in the first 3 min after the event. After this time the graph of cumulative mean abnormal
returns is almost horizontal and for t > 4 there are almost no abnormal changes in
the WIG20. This is in line with the results in Tables 3 and 4 where there is only one
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Fig. 3 Cumulative mean abnormal returns of the WIG20 (top panel), mWIG40 (middle panel) and sWIG80
(bottom panel). The thin line indicates CUM_AR after good news while the thick line describes minus
CUM_AR after bad news releases
significant mean abnormal return when bad news is announced, and three significant
ARt after a release of good news. The reaction to positive news (thin line) seems to
be slower than to bad news (thick line), but Mann-Whitney tests show no statistical
difference between the cumulative abnormal returns of the WIG20 for any t > 0. The
middle panel of Fig. 3 confirms previous results indicating that the reaction of the
mWIG is much slower than that of the WIG20. The cumulative impact of unexpected
news slowly increases up to 7–8 min, where it stabilizes. As above, there are no sig-
nificant differences between the total effect of bad news (thick line) and good news
(thin line) in the event window. The impact of unexpected news on the sWIG80 is
visible in the whole first 20 min after the release. Cumulative means slowly increase
for t > 0. As for the WIG20 and mWIG40, the cumulative effect of bad news does
not differ significantly from the cumulative effect of good news.
When we compare the reaction of each index to that of the others we can observe that
the total effect of unexpected news is strongest for the WIG20 where the cumulative
mean abnormal returns after 20 min are about 0.16 %, which is much higher than the
0.035 and 0.05 % for the mWIG40 and the sWIG80, respectively. In fact, almost the
whole value 0.16 % of the cumulative mean abnormal returns of the WIG20 is achieved
in the first 3 min.
In the final section we summarize the main findings of this empirical study.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we examine the impact of US macroeconomic data announcements on
indices of the Warsaw Stock Exchange from April 2007 to August 2013. We study
the impact of the six following indicators: the Consumer Price Index, Industrial Pro-
duction, the Producer Price Index, Durable Goods Orders, Retail Sales and Nonfarm
Payrolls. Three indices, namely the WIG20, mWIG40 and sWIG80 describe the behav-
ior of the stocks of large, medium-sized and small firms listed on the WSE. To examine
the impact of US announcements we apply an event study to 1-min returns of the above
indices.
The analysis in the paper confirms that announcements of a CPI and PPI below
forecast and announcements of DGO, RS, IP and NFP above forecast are seen as good
news by investors on the WSE, and vice versa, that a CPI and a PPI above the consensus
and DGO, RS, IP and NFP below the consensus are seen as bad news. Good news
imply positive abnormal returns of the WSE indices after announcements whereas bad
news imply negative abnormal returns after announcements. In the first minute after a
news release the WIG20 reacts significantly to IP, DGO, RS and NFP announcements
below the consensus and to PPI, DGO, RS and NFP above the consensus. The strongest
reaction is induced by news about NFP (−0.258 and 0.177 % for announcements below
and above the consensus, respectively). The impact of US data on the mWIG40 and
sWIG80 is not so easy to interpret. The index mWIG40 reacts to PPI, DGO, RS and
NFP announcements below the consensus and to PPI and NFP above the consensus.
Significant abnormal returns of the sWIG80 are observed after announcements of CPI,
PPI, DGO and NFP lower than forecasted and of IP, PPI, NFP greater than forecasted.
Hence, each kind of announcement induces a reaction of at least one index on the
WSE. The significant and very quick reaction of WSE indices to US macroeconomic
data announcements is in line with previous results for developed markets.
When all announcements are divided into two clusters: “bad news” and “good
news”, all indices react significantly in the first minute after a news release. This
indicates the high efficiency of the WSE. The strength and duration of the reaction
differs between indices. Significant mean abnormal returns of the WIG20 are observed
only in the first minute after bad news and in the first 3 min after good news. After that
the abnormal returns of the WIG20 are insignificant. The reactions of the mWIG40
and sWIG80 are weaker and slower than that of the WIG20. This result confirms the
speed of adjustment hypothesis.
The reaction of the WIG20 is also the strongest. Good news implies 0.1 % abnormal
change in WIG20 while bad news implies about −0.15 % change in the WIG20 in
the first minute after the announcements. However, performed tests indicate that the
difference in reaction of the WIG20 (and other WSE indices under study) to bad
or good news is insignificant. This contradicts the underreaction and overreaction
hypothesis.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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